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The ‘Jniteb States ( U S . )  Vision for Space Expioration, announced in January 2004, 
outlines the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s (NASA) strategic goals and 
objectives, including retiring the Space Shuttle and replacing it with new space 
transportation systems for missions to the Moon, Mars, and beyond. The Crew Exploration 
Vehicle (CEV) that the new human-rated Crew Launch Vehicle (CLV) lofts into space early 
next decade will initially ferry astronauts to the International Space Stat&(ISS)3o.wad 
the end of the next decade, a heavy-lift Cargo Launch Vehicle (CaLV) will deliver the Earth 
Departure Stage (EDS) carrying the Lunar Surface Access Module (LSAM) to low-Earth 
orbit (LEO), where it will rendezvous with the CEV launched on the CLV and return 
astronauts to the Moon for the first time in over 30 years. This paper outlines how NASA is 
building these new space transportation systems on a foundation of legacy technical and 
management knowledge, using extensive experience gained from past and ongoing launch 
vehicle programs to maximize its design and development approach, with the objective of 
reducing total life cycle costs through operational efficiencies such as hardware 
commonality. For example, the CLV in-line configuration is composed of a 5-segment 
Reusable Solid Rocket Booster (RSRB), which is an upgrade of the current Space Shuttle 4- 
segement RSRB, and a new upper stage powered by the liquid oxygenlliquid hydrogen 
(LONLH2) J-2X engine, which is an evolution of the 5-2 engine that powered the Apollo 
Program’s Saturn V second and third stages in the 1960s and 1970s. The CaLV 
configuration consists of a propulsion system composed of two 5-segment RSRBs and a 33- 
foot core stage that will provide the LOX/LED needed for five commercially available RS-68 
main engines. The J-2X also will power the EDS. The Exploration Launch Projects, 
managed by the Exploration Launch Office located at NASA’s Marshall Space Flight 
Center, is leading the design, development, testing, and operations planning for these new 
space transportation systems. Utilizing a foundation of heritage hardware and management 
lessons learned mitigates both technical and programmatic risk. Project engineers and 
managers work closely with the Space Shuttle Program to transition hardware, 
infrastructure, and workforce assets to the new launch systems, leveraging a wealth of 
knowledge from Shuffle operations. In addition, NASA and its industry partners have 
tapped into valuable Apollo databases and are applying corporate wisdom conveyed 
firsthand by Apollo-era veterans of America’s original Moon missions. Learning from its 
successes and failures, NASA employs rigorous systems engineering and systems 
management processes and principles in a disciplined, integrated fashion to further improve 
the probability of mission success. 
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I. Introduction 
The United States Vision for Space Exploration directs NASA to retire the venerable Space Shuttle in 20 10 and 
to develop safer, more reliable, and more cost-effective transportation systems in a timely manner to continue the 
jourxey of discovery from the unique vantage point of space.’ With this policy as its guidepost, NASA is in the 
process of developing a human-rated CLV capable of lifting 25 metric tons (Fig. 1) and a heavy-lift CaLV capable 
of lifting 125 metric tons (Fig. 2) for missions that will return astronauts to the Moon as the frrst step toward the 
eventual human exploration of Mars. These systems are based largely on evolutions of Apollo and Space Shuttle 
legacy hardware to maximize extensive aerospace databases and collaborative utilization of existing highly 
specialized resources with proven reliability. 
Figure 1. The Crew Launch Vehicle will deliver 25 metric tons to orbit (artist’s concept). 
In fiscal year 2005, NASA invested approximately $4.3 billion of its $16 billion budget on the Space Shuttle, 
and in fiscal year 2006, NASA invested $4.4 billion of a total $16.2 billion budget.273 NASA’s fiscal year 2007 
budget of almost $17 billion allocates $4 billion for the Shuttle and $3.9 billion for Exploration Systems to begin the 
process of developing the vehicles and support infrastructure needed to fulfill the missions outlined in the U.S. 
Vision for Space Exploration? NASA’s Exploration Launch Projects office has been chartered to deliver safe, 
reliable space transportation systems designed to minimize life cycle costs so that NASA’s budget can be more fully 
invested in missions of scientific discovery. NASA is applying aerospace best practices by leveraging existing 
technologies and resources and employing rigorous systems engineering and systems management standards to 
ensure that these new space transportation systems meet stringent standards and satisfy well-defined customer and 
stakeholder requirements. 
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Figure 2. The Cargo Launch Ve icle wiU deliver 125 metric tons to orbit (artist’s concept). 
Over the past few decades, NASA, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD), and private industry have invested 
in advanced propulsion technologies, some yielding a greater return on investment than others. Staying within the 
budget prescribed, and delivering within the timeframe needed, drives NASA’s 21St century space transportation 
fleet to draw on evolutionary technologies to the maximum extent possible and to implement a number of innovative 
operations concepts that reduce operations costs through such things as common tooling, manufacturing, and 
processing of components, subsystems, and systems. With a “test as you fly, and fly as you test” philosophy, the 
Exploration Launch Projects office draws on analysis results from subscale wind tunnel models (Fig. 3) and from 
computer aided applications that test integrated avionics software and simulate vehicle dynamics in cyberspace, 
leading to real-world testing with increasingly flight-like hardware to gain confidence in the systems before orbital 
flight tests that will yield even more information on which to base critical hardware decisions. 
igure 3. Crew Launch Vehicle scale model positioned in wind tunnel test facility. 
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Despite the impressive research and technology investments made by the aerospace community at large, the 
access to space remains elusive, its cost limiting the expansion of business potential into that fertile territory. 
Fielding a sustainable modem space transportation system is, therefore, a key decision driver in NASA’s current 
transportation strategy. For example, in December 2005, NASA released the draft announcement for Commercial 
Orbital Transportation Services Demonstrations, effectively opening the ISS resupply market to competitive bid by 
the aerospace industq, with the goal of reducing the logistics costs associated with that orbital outpost, where crews 
are learning to live and work in space for long  duration^.^ Commercial businesses may one day satisfy such 
emerging markets, allowing NASA to invest its budget more l l l y  in the “why” of exploration rather than on the 
“how”. 
While market forces may lead to fresh space access capabilities, NASA’s responsibility to deliver human-rated 
space systems and cargo designed for destinations beyond LEO is being fulfilled through its CLV and CaLV 
Projects. Most of the CLV and CaLV systems are being developed by industry teams, with Government insight, 
with a goal of reducing costs through a number of methods, ranging from validating requirements to conducting 
trades studies against potential designs. Operations concepts such as automated processing build on lessons learned 
from the Shuttle’s labor-intensive hands-on processing. Flight tests of the Delta Clipper-Experimental Advanced 
@C-XA) subscale vehicle in 1996 validated streamlined operations that utilized minimal touch labor, automated 
cryogenic propellant loading, and an 8-hour turnaround for a cryogenic propulsion system! For the CLV, the results 
of hazard analyses are leading to requirements for an integrated vehicle health monitoring system that will 
troubleshoot anomalies and determine which ones can be solved without human intervention. These and other 
advances will help standardize and economize mission scenarios, reducing the operations bottom line. 
The Exploration Launch Projects’ Government and industry team is in the process of designing, developing, 
testing, and evaluating @DT&E) vehicle confgurations that can best meet or exceed customer and stakeholder 
requirements, technical perfomance, and safety standards, as well as be ready within the desired timeframe and 
budget guidelines. Analysis shows that evolutionary systems, though not without risk, offer the best likelihood of 
delivering the needed launch vehicles capabilities? Therefore, the Exploration Launch Projects’ approach to mission 
success includes: 
. 
Leveraging existing technologies and applying lessons learned to work smarter. 
Building an accountable team that is dedicated to implementing aerospace best practices, including 
rigorous systems engineering and systems management, to mitigate the risks inherent ~ delivering complex 
prototype space transportation systems that fulfill stakeholder and customer requirements, including 
reduced operations costs from system inception to retirement. 
II. Maximizing Mature Technologies and Informative Knowledge Bases 
The value of applying lessons learned is undeniable. Countless review boards have been convened and libraries 
written to document the reasons for mission failures, with indictments of both technical and programmatic 
management. Perhaps the most important finding of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) Report was 
that the lack of an overarching vision to guide NASA’s challenging missions diluted its efforts and skewed its 
agenda.’ Now, the U.S. Vision for Space Exploration provides clear goals and objectives to guide technical and 
programmatic decisions, and the fmdings and recommendations provided by the CAIB give aerospace professionals 
sobering lessons that are being applied as legacy propulsion components are transformed into space transportation 
systems suitable for a new space age. 
The ultimate goal of the Exploration Launch Projects office is to deliver safe, reliable crew and cargo systems 
designed to minimize life cycle costs so that NASA can concentrate on missions of scientific discovery. To that end, 
the Space Shuttle follow-on systems are being designed and developed within the safety, reliability, and cost figures 
of merit (FOM) provided in tandem with design reference missions (DRM) that clearly define the various 
exploration-related destinations ahead. Together, these aspects form a trade space that is bounded by top-level 
requirements that are decomposed to lower system levels. A brief background of how the CLV and CaLV vehicle 
configurations were selected provides a frame of reference for the magnitude of hardware development currently in 
progress and insight into associated systems engineering and systems management processes employed. 
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To provide in-depth data for selecting these follow-on launch vehicles, the Exploration Systems Architecture 
Study (ESAS) was conducted during the summer of 2005, following the codinnation of the new NASA 
Administrator in April 2005. A team of aerospace subject matter experts used technical, budget, and schedule 
objectives to analyze a number of potential launch systems, both reusable and expendable, with a focus on human 
rating for exploration missions. The results showed that a variant of the Space Shuttle, utilizing the RSRB as the first 
stage, along with a new upper stage that uses a derivative of the SSME RS-25 modified to start at altitude, was the 
quickest path to delivering the CLV, while also meeting safety and cost guidelines. In January 2006, as part of the 
engineering trade studies conducted during the formulation phase, NASA streamlined its CLV hardware 
development approach, so that the propulsion elements now under development are more fully extensible to the 
heavy lift CaLV and future EDS lunar systems (see Fig. 4). 
Figure 4. The Earth Departure Stage and Crew Exploration Vehicle 
will rendezvous in low-Earth orbit (artist’s concept). 
Specifically, with the current approach, the CLV will use a 5-segment RSRB first stage instead of the modified 
Space Shuffle 4-segment RSRB originally proposed in the ESAS. A 5-segment RSRB was tested in 2003, 
demonstrating that configuration and establishing that the propellant burn rate can be tailored for current CaLV 
mission parameters. The CLV upper stage will use the J-2X engine, a derivative of the Saturn V’s S-I1 and S-M3 
upper stage main propulsion, which also will serve as the CaLV EDS engine. A key element of the J-2X engine, the 
turbomachinery, was successfully restarted during the X-33 Program in 1996. In a move that delivers more 
performance and saves at least 50 percent per main engine unit cost, the CaLV configuration employs a cluster of 5 
commercially available RS-68 engines upgraded to meet NASA’s standards and a Saturn-class 33-foot diameter 
core stage tank. 
This plan offers multiple benefits by developing one RSRB and one upper stage engine, reducing the total 
number of separate major hardware elements originally proposed in the ESAS. It also capitalizes on a low-cost 
expendable engine that can meet the high production rates that will be needed for CaLV missions. The resulting 
funding profile is more sustainable and the plan will reduce both recurring and nonrecurring operations costs 
through infrastructure (manufacturing and processing) commonality. In addition, the new safety and reliability 
projections are comparable to the ESAS recommended configuration. Although the first stage and upper stage 
engine selections have matured, the Moon mission “1.5 launch architecture” remains the same: the CLV will deliver 
the CEV to rendezvous in Low-Earth orbit with the EDS and L S M  deiivered by the CaLV (see Fig. 5). 
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Figure 5. Return to the Moon mission architecture. 
III. Applying Rigorous Systems Engineering and Systems Management Principles 
It is against this backdrop of multiple, parallel hardware efforts that NASA is using extensive experience gained 
from past and ongoing launch vehicle programs to maximize vehicle integration, both from an engineering 
perspective and from a management standpoint. The CLV and CaLV are being designed to reduce costs through a 
number of methods, ranging from validating requirements (what the system must do, how often, and when), to 
conducting trades studies, such as the ones described above, against the vehicle concepts to ensure that the optimum 
design solutions are selected during the current formulation phase, prior to the implementation phase that begins in 
2008.’ 
Each project phase is marked by a number of data deliverables that undergo systematic reviews performed by 
internal and independent experts who help guide decisions at critical junctures. Systems engineering is performed by 
the Exploration Launch Projects’ Vehicle Integration Element, which brings to bear management systems that knit 
together geographically dispersed business units. The Vehicle Integration Element functions as a centralized 
communications conduit for wide-ranging activities within a framework of open, honest interactions among the 
hundreds of individuals engaged in this complex business.“ 
Systems engineering reduces risk by providing a strong linkage between and among disparate engineering 
disciplines, from aerodynamics and avionics to mass properties and thermal control. The Vehicle Integration 
Element understands the pieces in relation to the integrated whole and is invested with the methods and means to 
ensure correct and proper functionality. Through systems engineering, trade study analyses are performed to 
dete,The the optimum solutions that fulfill customer a d  stzkehoolder requirements, focusing on the “-ilities,” such 
as reliability, maintainability, supportability, and operability. 
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Requirement management is one aspect of systems engineering that captures the goals and objectives that the 
integrated space transportation systems must deliver. Associated trade studies add to the space transportation 
knowledge base, while building on information captured during decades of successfbl, and not so successfbl, 
programs and projects to venfy and validate requirements in relation to the system options being considered. This 
flexible, durable design process allows a knowledge-based organization to effectively harness the volumes of 
information relaiive to the primarily existing propulsion technologies NASA has selected for its CLV and CaLV 
systems. 
Propulsion systems development is an extremely risky business. Utilizing specific technical and programmatic 
lessons learned, and understanding their implications for reducing the risk of developing CLV and CaLV systems, is 
paramount in the Exploration Launch Projects’ philosophy. For example, the J-2X upper stage engine is an 
evolution of a tried-and-true propulsion element that powered the Saturn V second and third stages during the 1960s 
and 1970. During the X-33 Program, the J-2X turbopumps were tested; recent analysis of that data and hardware 
helps inform the engine component design process. Interestingly: the J-2X engine prime contractor, Pratt & Whitney 
Rocketdyne, brought in over a dozen consultants who once were Apollo-era engineers on the first 5-2 engine to 
share firsthand their experiences with the new J-2X team. 
Add to these advantages NASA’s continuous risk management process (Fig. 6), which involves proactive risk 
identification techniques, such as assessments against the work breakdown structure that defines various tasks to 
identify, assess, plan mitigation, track, and control risks. Quantitative risk management techniques, such as 
probabilistic risk assessment, gauge the risk environment and optimize the use of resources to mitigate risk. Risk 
management is validated using an industry-accepted risk management capability maturity model. Monthly 
assessments are conducted and opportunities for improvements are identified. 
Figure 6. Continuous risk management process. 
To promote a knowledge-based organization - one that is continually attuned to the opportunities for 
gathering, capturing, and applying technical and programmatic lessons - requires disciplined commitment to 
learning fiom the past and contributing to the future. Managers are provided reference materials such as books and 
reports and are encouraged to share corporate knowledge and mentor junior engineers. The Exploration Launch 
Projects organization fosters a common vocabulary for clear communication among the engineers, technicians, 
business professionals, support personnel, and others involved in this demanding work.” Team members are 
responsible for applying, and rewarded for sharing, applicable lessons learned as part of an overall learning culture, 
as outlined in the Knowiedge Management Plan.”,’3 The tangible and intangible benefixs that accrue from 
knowledge management, enacted through these and other means, pay dividends in terms of increasing the potential 
for mission success. 
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The cost of access to space h i t s  the budget that can be invested the missions that space tramportation 
enables. The business of delivering new space transportation capabilities includes operations concepts that reduce 
both recurring costs, such as propulsion element production and sustaining engineering and processing the launch 
vehicle stack, and nonrecurring costs, such as modifjkg the existing launch infrastructure to accommodate these 
new systems (see Fig. 7). By studying the pros and cons of past and present launch vehicle processing, plans are for 
the various hardware elements to arrive at the launch facility in pre-configured sets (i.e., the engine will be mated 
with the upper stage element) for streamlined handling. The operations working group, as a subset of Vehicle 
Integration and part of the Constellation Ground and Mission Operations Systems Integration Group, ensures that 
logistics and other details are considered as part of the overall operations concept and requirements development. 
Figure 7. Crew Launch Vehicle on the launch pad (artist's concept). 
More than 4 decades of experience have taught us that effective management, rather than technology alone, is 
the key ingredient for a high rate of mission SUCC~SS. '~  Therefore, the Exploration Launch Projects organizational 
foundation establishes the hierarchy for technical insight and control mechanisms designed to produce quality 
components, subsystems, and systems that work together within well-defined tolerances and interface correctly with 
other systems, such as a payload integrating with a launch vehicle that then is positioned on the launch pad. Whereas 
programmatic control of the budget and schedule can gauge resources (namely, time and money) in relation to 
technical progress, the systems engineering and integration function serves as a conduit through which 
communication flows among the hundreds of technical personnel involved in a massive effort such as the 
Exploration Launch Projects. 
Learning fkom what worked during the Apollo era and applying modern business principles, NASA 
Headquarters has recently established a system of checks and balances that results in a healthy tension between 
technical and progammatic  concern^.'^ Chief Engineers are matrixed to the Exploration Launch Projects through a 
dedicated engineering organization and, therefore, maintain an independent technical voice. Safety and Mission 
Assurance representatives, also matrixed from another organization, provide independent opinions in their field. 
Also, an Independent Project Review Team has been commissioned to give an outside perspective regarding 
technical progress and issues that arise during the course of developing complex hardware systems destined for use 
in the harsh space environment. 
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Engineering and business information technologies are employed to effectively manage change; to estimate, 
track, and forecast resource utilization; and to determine technical progress against destones captured in an 
integrated master schedule (IMS) (Figs. 8 and 9). These and other systems engineering and systems management 
processes and procedures also build on a heritage foundation to give confidence that the launch vehicles fielded next 
decade can deliver the operational capability required more economically than current systems. From a management 
systems perspective, the Exploration Launch Projects team depends on tools such as a sound cod5gmation 
management process, as well as on rigorous internal and independent reviews that serve as decision gates on the 
path to delivering new space transportation capabilities. 
t 
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Figure 8. Preliminary Crew Launch Vehicle integrated master schedule. 
. . . ,  
e . . .  
. , . . . .  , ,  * . * I , I . .  
CaLV RkU RWJUCtlon 
CaLV Dvnlopmmn 
Figure 9. Preliminary Cargo Launch Vehicle integrated master schedule. 
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Within the systems engineering function, Integrated Product Teams report through a board structure to the 
Project- and Program-level Control Boards (CB) (Fig. 10). This hierarchy is documented in the Exploration Launch 
Projects Systems Engineering Management Plan (SEW).16 To spur innovation, decision-making is pushed to the 
lowest level possible. For example, the Vehicle Integration Control Board WCB) defines and reviews the results of 
systematic design analysis cycles, during which trade studies are conducted and findings reported. The reporting 
chain for decisions that must be made at higher levels, such as changes to the baseline vehicle configurations, is 
captured in the S E W  and in the Exploration Launch Projects Configuration Management Plan.'7 
I I 
Legend: 
CXCB - Constellation Systems Control Board 
CCB - Configuration Control Board 
ECB - Element Control Board 
ERB - Engineering Review Board 
GO -Ground Operations 
VERB -Vehicle Engineering Review Board 
Figure 10. Configuration control is achieved through interrelated boards. 
As specified in the NASA instruction on program and project management, a series of internal and independent 
reviews is conducted throughout the project's life cycle to serve as check-points for a number of engineering 
products, such as drawings and specifications, and to gauge progress against established funding guidelines and 
schedule milestones. l7 Non-advocate reviews survey technical and programmatic documentation and provide forums 
for interactive discussions relative to project progress. The series of reviews is listed in Table 1 below. 
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Table 1. NASA project internal technical reviews. 
Review Title 
System Requirements Review 
Preliminary Design Review 
Critical Design Review 
Design Certification Review 
Flight Readiness Review 
Assures that requirements are properly defined, verifiable, and 
implemented, are traceable, and A h t  he hardware and sofhare are 
designed and built to the authorized baseline configuration. 
Provides completed design specifications, the identification and 
acquisition of long-lead items, manufacturing plans, and life cycle 
cost estimates; the design is 30% complete and element 
specifications are baselined. 
Discloses the complete system in full detail; ascertains that technical 
prnb!m a d  &sip mgrrralies have been resnlved; md ensures &at 
the design maturity justifies the decision to begin 
fabricatinglmanufacturing, integration, and verification of mission 
hardware and software. The design is 90% complete. 
Serves as the control gate that ensures the system can accomplish its 
mission goals. Requirements are verified in a manner that supports 
launch operations. 
After the system has been configured for launch, the Flight 
Readiness Review (FRR) process examines tests, demo&rations, 
analyses, and audits that determine the system’s readiness for a safe 
and successful launch and for subsequent flight operations. The 
Project Manager and Chief Engineer certify that the system is ready 
for safe flight. 
IV. Conclusion: The Journey Continues 
NASA is accountable for delivering on the strategic goals set forth in the Vision for Space Exploration; 
therefore, it is investing its near-term resources in returning astronauts to the Moon as the logical first step toward 
the eventual human exploration of Mars - both events that will affect the future for generations to come. NASA’s 
Exploration Launch Projects office is addressing the magnitude of work needed to deliver improved transportation 
systems tailored to empower a new age of space exploration. 
NASA is committed to applying rigorous systems engineering and systems management processes and 
standards to ensure that technical performance is accurately reflected in, and inextricably connected to, budget 
allocations and schedule milestones. By building on a foundation of heritage hardware and applying lessons learned 
fiom past and current missions, the probability of success is greatly increased. 
On the Moon, astronauts will gain the experience needed to travel to other worlds and learn to work 
productively while relatively close to home. These lunar missions will serve as test-beds for technologies and 
management practices that will enable the eventual first human trips to Mars, Earth’s closest planetary neighbor. 
While robotic spacecraft and rovers provide mapping data, scout potential landing sites, and locate in situ resources 
that can be utilized by the first Moon settlers and the first explorers on Mars, NASA and its partners are engaged in 
the task of designing, developing, testing, fielding, and operating the space transportation systems that will carry 
those for whom the journey of discovery has begun anew. 
Mission success demands a disciplined, innovative approach to developing CLV and CaLV systems that deliver 
greater safety and reliability, along with marked reductions in operations costs. Building on a foundation of heritage 
knowledge is a prime risk reduction strategy being applied by NASA’s Exploration Launch Projects ofice, which is 
dedicated to delivering sustainable transportation solutions that result in more cost-effective access to space. 
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